Lisa GUERNSEYSEPT.
2004 computer voting machines attracted a lot of attention in this year's election, but one system received particularly close attention: AccuVote-TS. The AccuVote-
TS conducted at least four studies to expose security breaches within 14 months.
This spring, California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley slammed the manufacturer Diebold election system for not following the appropriate procedures when updating the software.
These problems and battery defects caused some machines to be unavailable for several hours during the main parade, prompting Mr.
Shelley orders all counties with touch
A screen machine that provides a paper alternative.
However, AccuVote-
TS will be used by more voters this fall.
According to the research firm election data service, electoral districts with more than 6% registered voters will use Diebold's system.
It says that in general, 29% of voters are registered in constituencies that will vote electronically.
Almost all voters in Maryland and Georgia will use AccuVote-
TS is also the main machine used in Alameda County and pullamas County, California. (
There is only one jurisdiction in New York. -
Clifton Park, near sheenkadi-will use touch-
Screen machines, they are made by the Diebold competitor Sequoia voting system. )
No matter what machine is used, hackers and glitches will be excluded, advertising officials say.
"Voters can rest assured that we have done everything possible to make voting equipment safe and reliable for their use," said Linda Lamont, director of the Maryland Electoral Commission.
What exactly is advertising doing to build this confidence?
Here are some common-
References are made to the risks associated with the Diebold machine and how they are mitigated.
David Bell, a spokesman for Diebold, said concerns about computer voting machines being hacked into the Internet could be temporarily calmed down.
There is no AccuVote machine connected to the Internet, and there is no server that handles the final number.
At the end of the election night, the total number of votes per machine can be transmitted to the central office in two ways: by hand carrying the memory cards and prints attached to each machine, or connect to a private telephone line via a modem.
However, security analysts say someone can access the telephone line to get the total and change the total before reporting.
Roxanne Jekot, a computer programmer, maintains a protest site called "vote.
Many of the lines used for transmission are fax lines from public schools, and the numbers of these lines are easily accessible, Org said.
Several security reports last year urged Diebold to encrypt the transmission of data in order to appear gibberish to anyone without a key.
According to officials, two counties in Maryland and California will use an updated version of the AccuVote system that includes this encryption.
But in Georgia, since the state is using an older version of the system, the data transmitted is not encrypted.
Chris Rigel, spokesman for Georgia's secretary of state Kathy Cox, said state officials decided they could not screen the new system in time before the fall elections.
If the data transmitted is contaminated, election officials say they will be able to find out the problem once official statistics are completed.
Use AccuVote in all three countries-
TS, the election procedure requires the officer to compare the total number obtained from the machine memory card and print output to the total number on the modem.
If the number does not match, the total number compiled before the phone-
Line transmission is most likely to be used.
"The final result count will never come from the modem --
"Total Ed results ,"Riggall said.
Software testing David L.
Deere, a computer scientist at Stanford University, said that it is always possible for internal programmers to implant a piece of code before data transmission, switching votes from one candidate to another.
Other experts also warn about unintentional software failures.
For example, what if the software contains some vague errors that subtract a candidate's vote every 100 votes?
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Diebold and election officials noted that the machine had undergone many tests before the voting began.
National, state and independent agencies conduct assessments.
At the end of these tests, the machine is sealed with tamper-proof tape.
In the advertisement a few days before the election, each machine has passed the "logic and accuracy" test. in the test, each game has to vote to ensure that the votes are written correctly and the numbers are added.
It was not until the election morning that the machine was sealed again when a print output was generated to show that no vote had yet been cast.
But Aviel D said, "You can never find all the bugs . "
Rubin is a computer scientist at John Hopkins University, and
In July 2003, the author of the first report criticizing Diebold.
"You can never be perfect.
"When voters arrive at the polling station, they receive a smart card with an electronic chip that can be plugged into a touch screen unit and voted for their specific constituency or region.
Dr. report of July 2003
Rubin and three other computer scientists say the two Fort di cards could be hacked.
They envision a scenario where people can fake cards for multiple votes. Mr.
Riggall said voting staff were trained to compare the total number of consecutive votes to the number of people who came to vote.
He said they would be able to quickly find out if someone had stuffed the ballot boxes.
What about other tampering attempts?
In a simulation last year, a team of experts from RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Md.
, Trying to hack the card by guessing the password.
After several guesses, the team was able to access the contents of the card and created a fake supervision card.
With such a card the offender can disable Touchscreen unit.
Since then, security measures have been strengthened in Fort di.
It creates a way for authorized voting staff to quickly change the password of the card if necessary.
Maryland and California will use the system in November.
However, Georgia will not do this because it cannot be tested on 24,500 machines in a timely mannerRiggall said.
At the same time, reports of Diebold and its competitors malfunctioning on machines have been spread through websites built by voter rights activists and computer scientists. (
These included verified votes.
Org and Black Box Voting. org. )
But the pressure of suppliers, even e-commerce
Voting critics agree that the shortcomings will affect any machine, whether electronic or otherwise.
A mechanical rod or an optical scanner may fail like a battery.
The training of polling staff may be poor.
Voters make mistakes.
Website officer using email
The voting machine said they were ready for the scenes.
They say they are training voting staff to handle the fault, just as they solve the problem on optical scanners, levers, and punch presses --card machines.
Critics say they can only hope that the problem will not be serious enough to get to the point where votes need to be recounted, because paper votes do not exist.
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A version of the article was printed on page 8 of the National edition Gilles on September 16, 2004, with the title: How it works;
Vote-
Responsible for counting machines.